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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARVIN BROWN, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Case No: 20080771-CA 
1 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS WAS NOT RELEVANT TO 
PROVE INTENT AND THUS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED UNDER 
RULE 404(b) 
"Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible at trial provided it has 'a special 
relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other than to show the 
defendant's predisposition to criminality.'" State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1990), 
{quoting State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989) (internal quotations 
omitted)); see also State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988). Otherwise, "unless 
the other crimes evidence tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime charged-
other than the defendant's propensity to commit crime-it is irrelevant and should be 
excluded by the court pursuant to rule 402." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^  22, 993 
P.2d 837 (Utah 1999). 
The State has claimed in its brief that intent was a contested issue. Appellee's 
Brief at 12. Brown asserts that the evidence of his prior conviction for theft has no 
special relevance to the intent element of charged retail theft, and in practice such 
evidence only functioned to improperly prove a propensity to steal. The State has argued 
that evidence of Brown's prior theft conviction was relevant to prove intent because the 
circumstances of the two events were similar. "The fact that Defendant had previously 
used a similar ruse to steal merchandise from Wal-Mart tended to negate his claim in this 
case that he did not intend to steal the batteries." Appellee's Brief at 8. However, the 
argument it uses to support this theory is perhaps better suited to prove modus operandi 
rather than intent. Brown asserts that nothing about the prior conviction for retail theft is 
probative of his intent to commit retail theft in the charged offense; and that to interpret 
intent as the State and the trial court have is to confuse intent for propensity. Brown 
further asserts that the similarity between the two instances that the State alleges 
justifying the non-character use of the prior crimes evidence is insufficient to qualify as a 
404(b) exception. 
Intent is "the mental resolution or determination" to do some act. BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY "intent" (8th ed. 2004), see also Edward L. Kimball, Roland N. Bouce, 
Utah Evidence Law 4-110 (2nd ed. 2004) ("Intent in this context [404(b)] means mens 
rea or state of mind, broad enough to include recklessness, purposefulness, malice, and 
sanity"). Modus^perandi is a pattern of criminal behavior-so distinctive that 
investigators attribute it to the work of the same person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
"modus operandi" (8th ed. 2004). In either case, whether for the purpose of proving 
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intent or modus operandi, Brown asserts that the evidence of his prior theft conviction 
was improperly admitted because it is not relevant or probative of intent and is not 
sufficiently unique to establish a modus operandi. 
a. Intent 
The State's argument seems to be that because the two allegations of theft were 
similar, evidence that Brown stole in the prior instance is relevant to prove Brown 
specifically intended to deprive Maceys of merchandise in the charged crime. Brown 
rejects this claim as a pretense used to admit improper propensity evidence. Because the 
intent at issue is specific intent, in order to commit retail theft one must not only take or 
conceal merchandise but one must also intend to permanently retain or deprive the 
merchant of the merchandise. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-6-602. This specific intent 
is important to this appeal because the evidence of the prior crime must be relevant to 
prove a specific mental state with relation to a specific piece of merchandise. 
Here the similarities between the crimes, if any, are insignificant and not probative 
of Brown's intent to steal in batteries from Maceys. The fact that Brown previously 
stole from Wal-Mart gives no amount of insight, beyond propensity, to his mental 
resolution or determination relative to the batteries at Maceys. Brown's intent to deprive 
Maceys of the batteries is not shown by any prior similar conduct. See State v. Barber, 
141 P.2d 436, 439 (Utah App. 1987) (intent to permanently deprive retailer of the 
merchandise reasonably inferred from the conduct of the theft). 
The State's brief concedes that Brown's account of the alleged theft in this case 
(that he did not intend to steal the batteries and was merely looking for his father when he 
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was confronted) was a plausible story. Appellee's Brief at 14. "But the plausibility of 
that claim evaporates when one knows that Defendant had been convicted of stealing 
from another store using a similar technique" and that the "prior conviction suggested, at 
a minimum, that once a person had been convicted under those circumstances, he would 
be on notice that similar conduct could be taken as a sign of guilt-certainly, it would rebut 
a claim of innocence." Appellee's Brief at 14-15. Defendant asserts that this position 
clearly reveals the State's true purpose to use the prior theft evidence to prove propensity * 
rather than intent. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 302, 247 n.5 (Chadbourne rev. 1979) 
(prior automobile thefts and grand larcenies were relevant to show intent to steal only by 
reasoning that the accused is a man of bad character and as such more likely than not to 
have a bad purpose in otherwise innocent conduct). Nothing about the prior offense 
tends to prove Brown intended to permanently deprive Maceys of the batteries on June 
19, 2007 beyond proof a bad character. 
The State asserts that the prior conviction was "relevant because it had a tendency 
to disprove Defendant's lack of intent." Appellee's Brief at 16. However, the State gives 
no explanation as to how the prior theft is relevant, it merely asserts that intent was at 
issue and the prior crime is probative of intent because the prior theft rebuts Brown's 
claim of innocence. Appellee's Brief at 15. Brown asserts that the State's failure to 
explain how the prior crime is relevant can be explained by recognizing that any 
explanation would show the only relevance was based on bad character and propensity. 
The State's mere assertion or relevance is inadequate to establish the special relevance 
required to admit highly prejudicial prior crime evidence. The State also asserts that 
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evidence of Brown's prior theft tends to prove that his arguably innocent conduct in this 
case was criminal because it was so similar to prior criminal conduct and he should have 
known it would be seen as such. Appellee's Brief at 14-15. But whether or not Brown 
should have known his conduct would have been suspicious has no bearing on his intent 
to steal. The fact that Brown should have known something might look suspicious does 
not mean it has "any tendency to make the existence o f his intent to steal "more 
probable or less probable[.]" UTAH R.EVID. 401. 
The State cites State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997) as an example of a 
case where evidence of dissimilar crimes is relevant to prove intent to commit the 
charged crime. In Pearson the defendant had been involved in the sale of drugs in 
Indiana and had become an informant in order to avoid charges. The defendant then fled 
Indiana and attracted the attention of the police in Utah for stealing gas. During the 
pursuit the defendant shot and killed a police officer. At the defendant's trial for 
aggravated murder the State sought to introduce evidence of the drug offenses in Indiana 
in order to prove the defendant killed the officer intentionally as opposed to recklessly, as 
claimed by the defense. The Court found that the prior crimes were relevant to intent 
because "[t]he more reasons Pearson had to kill the officer and evade capture and future 
dealings with law enforcement, the more plausible was the State's theory that he did so 
intentionally rather than recklessly." Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1351. 
Pearson's prior act gave him a motive-to-kill and that motive was relevant to intent. 
In this case the prior retail theft had no relationship to Brown's conduct in the charged 
case. The fact that he had been convicted of theft before provided no motive or reason to 
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commit another theft. The fact that Brown had stolen before did not explain why he held 
the batteries held beneath a box of chicken as he walked through the store. 
The State also cites State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 108 P.3d 730 (Utah 2005) for the 
proposition that dissimilar crimes may be relevant in a particular case. Appellee's Brief at 
15. Brown accepts that prior convictions for dissimilar crimes may be relevant but notes 
that in Allen the Court upheld the admission of the prior bad acts because the prior 
fraudulent purchases were legitimately tied to the conspiracy of the charged crime, 
justifying admission to prove preparation and plan. State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, U 18, 21. 
Here no such justification exists because there are no ties between the prior theft and the 
charged theft. The prior theft from Walmart was not part of the same plan extended over 
many months. These were two unrelated incidents, and admission of the first to prove 
intent to accomplish the second cannot be justified by reference to Allen. 
Another example of a prior bad act being relevant to intent can be found in State v. 
Mead, 2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 115 (Utah 2001). In Mead the defendant was convicted of 
murdering his wife. Prior to her death the defendant had made statements that it would 
be better to kill his wife than divorce her, that she was going to have an accident, and the 
defendant asked someone to kill her. State v. Mead, ^ 60. The Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that these prior statements were bad acts but were admissible under rule 404(b) as 
evidence of motive, plan, and intent to kill. Mead at ^ 62. The State had to prove that the 
defendant "intentionally or knowingly eause[d] the death of5 his wife and because the 
statements about planning to kill his wife were relevant to his state of mind at the time of 
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her death the Court properly admitted the statements under 404(b). UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED § 76-5-203(2)(a). 
However, Mead is clearly distinguishable from the instant case because the Mead's 
prior statements and plans had a special relevance to his intent in the charged murder. 
Here the prior theft has no relevance to Brown's intent. See also State v. Shickles, 760 
P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1988) (conviction required proof that defendant took a child with 
specific intent to keep or conceal the child from her parents so other crimes evidence that 
defendant sexually abused the child during the incident was relevant to prove defendant's 
intent). 
Not to belabor the point, but Brown asserts that the relationship between the prior 
conviction for theft and the contested element of intent in the instant case is non-existent. 
It is Brown's position that the only possible use of the prior conviction in this case was to 
show that Brown had a propensity to commit crimes, theft in particular, and that he acted 
in conformity with that bad character as he walked through Maceys with batteries in his 
hand, conduct that the State has admitted was otherwise plausibly innocent. As such 
Brown alleges that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior conviction as an 
exception under rule 404(b) where it should have excluded the evidence under the rule. 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." UTAH R. EVID. 404(b). To 
interpret the intent exception to 404(b) in the^way the trial court has, finding Brown's 
prior retail theft relevant to intent, is to render the character prohibition of 404(b) utterly 
ineffective and useless. It enables the State to introduce any evidence of prior bad acts as 
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evidence of intent because prior criminal conduct gives the accused notice that future 
"similar conduct could be taken as a sign of guilt" regardless of his actual intent. 
Appellee's Brief at 14-15. But such an interpretation of rule 404(b) is improper. 
"[Statutory enactments" (and Brown would argue the rules of evidence) "are to be 
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations 
are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd." Millett v. 
Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980); Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385 
(1977); Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971); In re Utah Savings and 
Loan, 442 P.2d 929 (1968). The trial courts ruling renders the prohibition of character 
use of prior crimes evidence meaningless. Because there is no connection between the 
prior retail theft and the contested issue of intent in the charged crime, the trial court's 
admission as an exception under 404(b) was an error. 
b. Modus Operandi 
The State also alleges that the conduct in the prior conviction was similar in that it 
"involved a similar deception" wherein Brown "used previously-purchased items to give 
store employees the impression that he had already paid for the items he was taking." 
Appellee's Brief at 13-14. Brown asserts that these similarities fail to prove a common 
scheme or plan or modus operandi. 
This failure is demonstrated in State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1990). In Cox 
the-State argued that similarities between the^eharged rape and three prior allegations of 
rape justified admission "because the evidence show[ed] a modus operandi or common 
design which" rebutted the defense. Cox, 787 P.2d at 6. The State alleged that there 
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were six (6) common factors in each assault and that those similarities constituted a 
modus operandi. This Court found that similarities between the charged rape and the 
prior assaults did not constitute a "common design or modus operandi," that they were 
"not particularly distinctive of defendant's conduct" and that they were "not so unique as 
to constitute a signature." Cox, at 6 {citing State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 428 (Utah 
1989), Youngbloodv. Sullivan, 628 P.2d 400, 402 (Or. App. 1981)). In Cox the State had 
"fallen into the common error of equating acts and circumstances which are merely 
similar in nature with the more narrow scheme or plan." Cox at 6. 
Here the 'similarities' are even less persuasive than in Cox. The State claims that 
in "both instances, Defendant used previously-purchased items to give store employees 
the impression that he had already paid for the items he was taking." Appellee's Brief at 
14. However, this characterization is oversimplified. In Brown's prior conviction for 
retail theft he used return stickers to make it appear that the item he was taking from the 
store had already been purchased. He did not try to conceal the item but tried to give the 
item the appearance that it had already been paid for. In the charged offense it was 
alleged that Brown used a previously purchased box of chicken to conceal several small 
batteries as he walked through the store and past the check stand. In the prior case the 
theft was based on passing a non-purchased item off as a purchased item. In the charged 
case the theft was based on hiding the non-purchased item, not much different than 
hiding the batteries in his pockets 
Surely the two allegations of theft at issue here are not so uniquely similar as to 
constitute a signature. The similarities they do share are likely shared with the majority 
9 
of all retail thefts and courts have held that such similarities do not constitute modus 
operandi. See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 190, pg. 756 (Broun, 6th ed. 2006) ("Much more 
is demanded than a mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as 
repeated murders, robberies or rapes. The pattern and characteristics of the crimes must 
be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature"). The vague similarities in this 
case do not constitute a modus operandi and thus in not justified as a modus operandi 
exception to the 404(b) exclusion of prior crimes. 
Finally, modus operandi is probative in criminal prosecutions because it 
establishes that when the identity of a person who engaged in prior conduct is known, it 
is more likely that the same person engaged in the charged conduct because of the 
striking similarities between the two crimes. Brown's identity was not at issue, clearly he 
was at Maceys on the day in question with the batteries in his hand. Accordingly modus 
operandi was irrelevant. The prior theft's similarity to the charged theft does not make it 
more probable that it was Brown who was seen with the batteries, those facts were not in 
dispute. "If identity is undisputed... M.O. could be said to be irrelevant when offered on 
that issue because it does not make identity more probable." Edward L. Kimball, Roland 
N. Bouce, Utah Evidence Law 4-113, n. 192 (2nd ed. 2004). 
Despite the repeated assertion that the prior conviction was relevant to prove 
intent, neither the State, nor the trial court on the record, gives any recognizable reason 
why evidence of the prior conviction was relevant to or probative of his intent to steal in 
the instant case justifying admission of the prior bad act into evidence. Appellee's Brief 
at 8, 9, 13, 14,16. Because the evidence of Brown's prior retail theft is neither probative 
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of his intent to permanently deprive Maceys of batteries in the charged offense, nor is it 
similar and unique enough to constitute a modus operandi the trial court improperly 
admitted the prior conviction as an exception under Rule 404(b). 
II. EVEN IF RELEVANT, EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD 
ACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED BY RULE 403 
"Even if evidence of other crimes has relevance beyond mere criminal disposition, 
it is still subject to the protections of Utah R. Evid. 403." Cox, 787 P.2d at 5. In applying 
the rule 403 balancing test this Court should consider factors applied in State v. Shickles, 
760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1989) where the Utah Supreme Court noted that "the similarities 
between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for 
the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence 
probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility" must be considered when 
"deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice^]" Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295 {quoting 
10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice, 404.21 [2] (2d ed. 1988)). 
The State's Brief addresses these factors and superficially applies them to the facts 
of this case. Appellee's Brief at 18. In reply Brown would argue, equally perfunctorily, 
that the factors applies to this case should have resulted in a finding of undue prejudice. 
As noted above (supra at 8-10), the two crimes were not similar enough to create any 
relevance either on the matter of intent or modus operandi. Next, the State claims that 
"the prior theft was necessary to rebut Defendant's claim that his purpose in walking 
toward the exit with the hidden batteries was purely innocent. Without the prior theft 
conviction, the jury would be left to resolve what Defendant was thinking based solely on 
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his testimony and prior statements." Appellee's Brief at 19. It seems natural to follow 
such a statement with the following: "But with the prior theft conviction, the jury would 
be free to presume that otherwise innocent conduct was criminal because similar conduct 
in the past was admittedly criminal." Brown contests that the State's 'necessary' 
argument supports precisely the type of evidence and inference rule 404(b) was designed 
to exclude. It appears that the fourth Shickles factor is being misapplied by the State. By 
the State's own admission, in the following paragraph, the evidence was not necessary in 
the Shickles sense. "While [alternative proof] may have been sufficient to find Defendant 
guilty, his claim of innocence—without the prior theft evidence—might have sowed a 
reasonable doubt in the jury's mind," Appellee's Brief at 19. 
According to the State, the prior crime evidence is either necessary but would be 
used as improper character evidence, or is not necessary because the alternative proof 
may have been sufficient. The State seems to be arguing both sides of the fence on the 
fourth and fifth Shickles factors. 
Finally, while evidence of the prior retail theft may not have been the kind of 
evidence that would "rouse the jury to overmastering hostility[,]" like evidence of a prior 
rape or homicide, because the case dealt with a relatively trivial crime, a correspondingly 
relatively trivial amount of prejudice would have a real impact on the jury. 
The State alleges that although evidence of Brown's prior conviction may be 
prejudicial the "risk of unfairly prejudicing the jury was minimal." Appellee's Brief at 
21. However, the 403 balancing depends on some quantum of relevant probative value. 
Even if, as the State asserts, the risk of unfair prejudice was minimal, because no relevant 
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probative value exists in the admission of the prior theft, that minimal unfair prejudice 
would substantially outweigh the nonexistent probative value. 
The State goes on to assert that the prosecutor's, arguably confusing, closing 
statement1 would prevent any unfair prejudice by reiterating the limiting instruction. 
Appellee's Brief at 20-21. But the content of that closing and its reference to the limiting 
instruction was both confusing and only acted to further the prejudicial nature of the prior 
crimes evidence. Despite presumably good intentions on the part of the prosecutor the 
closing statement most likely reinforced the improper use of the prior theft and 
emphasized the propensity or bad character nature of the evidence. 
For all of these reasons the unfair prejudice created by evidence of Brown's prior 
theft substantially outweighed any probative value and the evidence should have 
excluded under rule 403. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND A HARMFUL ERROR 
'This court (Supreme Court) reviews evidentiary rulings on prior crime testimony 
with limited deference, reviewing closely the trial court's exercise of discretion." State v. 
Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997). In reviewing the trial court's admission of 
Brown's prior conviction this Court should "review the record to determine whether the 
admission of other bad acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in 
the proper exercise of that discretion. ""State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, % 16, 6 
"The idea that because you've committed a theft previously that you've committed this 
theft or that that's evidence that yes, well, you were a thief then so you're probably [a] 
thief now. That is entirely inappropriate." R. 182: 319. 
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P.3d 1120 (Utah 2000) (quoting State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, U 18, 993 P.2d 837, 843 
(Utah 1999) ("admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined 
by trial judges in the proper exercise of discretion"); see also State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 
TJ 60. Upon such a close review this Court should find that the trial court's evidentiary 
ruling with respect to the prior crimes evidence was erroneous and an abuse of discretion 
because no reasonable person, under an accurate interpretation of rule 404(b), could find 
that the prior theft was both relevant to intent (or modus operandi). 
Finally, the trial court's 404(b) ruling was harmful error. "Absent evidence of the 
prior theft, Defendant's claim that he did not intend to steal the batteries, but was only 
looking for his father, was plausible. This is particularly true where Defendant was 
stopped before he actually left the store." Appellee's Brief at 14, (citing R. 182:142, 
150.)) As admitted by the State, the evidence of Brown's prior theft made arguably 
innocent and presumably legal conduct appear sinister. Appellee's Brief at 14-15. "A 
harmful error occurs where uthe likelihood of a different outcome [in the absence of the 
error is] sufficiently high [so as] to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Adams, 
2000 UT 42,1f 20, 5 P.3d 642, 648 (Utah 2000) (citing State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 
(Utah 1987)). If it had not been for the admission of the prior crime evidence the 
evidence presented at trial would have been that Brown was stopped within the store 
holding items not yet paid for but within the store in an area where items were on display 
and where shopping takes place. R. 182: 151-53 (Brown was stopped near the door where 
items are displayed for sale). 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to require the State to produce an 
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articulable non-character purpose as an exception to rule 404(b). That abuse of discretion 
was a harmful error because there is a reasonable likelihood that but for the admission of 
the prior theft the jury would have considered Brown's conduct insufficient to prove he 
intended to deprive Maceys of the batteries. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The admission of Brown's prior retail theft violated the general rule against 
admitting prior crimes evidence and does not qualify under the non-character purposes 
exceptions of rule 404(b). Further the admission of the prior theft created unfair 
prejudice that substantially outweighed the nonexistent probative value of the evidence. 
The error in admitting this evidence was an abuse of the trial court's discretion and 
resulted in a harmful error. For that reason Brown requests this Court to reverse the 
conviction and the trial court's ruling with respect to the 404(b) evidence and remand for 
further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of October, 2009. 
Margaret P. Lindsay ^J^-— 
Counsel for Appellant ^^ 
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